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The Water Development in the lake Balkhash Basin
more than twenty years have passed since the disintegration of the soviet union, 
the irst socialistic state in world history. Whereas the Soviet Union pursued its 
socialistic way of modernization, in reality, we can ind many more common 
characteristics than differences between modernity in socialist and capitalist states 
in the twentieth century. David L. Hoffman rightly mentioned that “socialism itself 
was one of the many ideological products of European modernity.”1 James scott 
emphasized that modern states strove to make countable and visible all human 
resources as well as natural wealth, which was a core feature of modernization 
and could be ensured only through large‑scale, standardized measures.2 In the 
Soviet context, leaders and policymakers had unalterably pursued these features 
of modernity through planned economy, grandiose formalized developmental 
projects, and socialization and man‑induced manipulation of the workforce as well 
as of natural resources. The Soviet “democratic centralism” gave policymakers 
virtually limitless authority to politically endorse and expeditiously realize these 
socialist modernization measures.
The grandiose water development in Central Asia was the most typical and 
comprehensible example of socialist modernization in the Soviet Union. Its biggest 
fruits were huge dam constructions in the Aral Sea, Lake Balkhash, and Ob‑Irtysh 
river basins, and lengthwise grandiose irrigation canals and drainage systems for 
1. David L. Hoffmann, “European Modernity and Soviet Socialism,” in David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), 257.
2. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
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cotton and rice. Paul Josephson noted that “hydropower in the Soviet Union had 
its roots in Enlightenment notions of nature and the desirability of man’s dominion 
over it.”3 This desire was legitimized by the “transformation of nature” concept 
in the soviet union, which marxist philosophers and soviet geographers had 
elaborated in earnest since the postwar Stalin period.
However, the water development in Central Asia inally resulted in the Aral Sea 
catastrophe, which can be listed as “the greatest man‑caused ecological catastrophe” 
in the whole history of mankind.4 As is well known, anthropogenic factors like 
over‑irrigation and low water eficiency in the basin were the direct cause of the 
shrinkage of the Aral Sea. The Soviet governmental authorities and intellectuals 
recognized them quite well, but they did not (or “could not”) take sweeping, 
comprehensive measures to save the Aral Sea. Soviet policymakers and planners 
assumed that every detail of locales were countable and visible to them, whereas in 
reality, they were absolutely invisible because “locales” and “places” were always 
distant and, more importantly, separated from the metropolis. The centralized 
party‑state oficials always assumed that they could count and grasp all about localities 
despite never seeing directly what was going on there. Anthony Giddens deined 
such phenomena as the “separation of space from place”5. In the case of the Aral 
Sea basin, it resulted in on‑site irrational use of water resources and impermissible 
disposition of irrigated plots on marginal farmlands by local bureaucrats and actual 
tillers of plots, only to make hypocritical shows of accomplishment of plans. This 
was really one of the limits of modernization under a planned economy.
At the same time, “relexive modernization” also functioned in the Soviet Union.6 
As discussed below, from the beginning of the 1960s, not only a number of Soviet 
intellectuals but also some engineers began to suppose that the transformation of 
nature itself was good, but that negative feedback on human activities from the 
transformed nature should be taken into account, when a developmental project was 
actually planned. The Soviet geographers of the Institute of Geography, U.S.S.R. 
Academy of Sciences, explicitly conceptualized this change in way of thinking, 
and modiied the “transformation of nature” concept, which was initially reined 
during “Stalin’s Plan for Transformation of Nature” in the post‑war Stalin period. 
3. Paul Josephson, Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World (Washington: Island Press, 2002), 24.
4. Marq de Villers, Water: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource (N.Y.: Mariner Books, 2001), 106.
5. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 18‑19.
6. As Giddens noted, “reflexivity” is the consistent “never‑to‑be‑relaxed monitoring” of actions, which is “the necessary basis of modernity.” In this sense, “reflexive modernity” is a corollary of the monitoring of the modernization process itself. Ulrich Beck characterized it as “the self‑confrontation with the effects of risk society” in the industrial era, which urges the transformation of the approaches and practices of modernization. Giddens, The Consequences 
of modernity, 36‑37; Ulrich Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization,” in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, reflexive Modernization: Politics, Traditions and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 6.
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However, this Soviet version of “relexiveness” in practice spoiled the legitimacy 
of the “socialist” variation of modernization. The alteration of the socialist concept 
of modernization and the approach to the human‑nature relationship contradictorily 
played a role in hampering the actual realization of some developmental projects 
in the agricultural‑water sector in Central Asia. The restoration of the irrigation 
development in the Lake Balkhash basin is one good example that occurred during 
the Brezhnev era. We can also observe the causes of the ininite postponement and 
inal rejection of the Siberian rivers diversion project from this perspective.
In this paper, irst, the author will make a rough sketch of the “transformation of 
nature” concept and the chronological change of its content. It will be clearly shown 
that the Soviet geographers of the Institute of Geography in Moscow gradually 
modiied the “transformation of nature” concept during the 1960‑1970s. Second, 
the author will overview the developmental plans in the Lake Balkhash basin, 
correlating them with the “transformation of nature” concept, especially under the 
Brezhnev authorities. Finally, this paper will argue that “relexive modernization” 
under the socialist regime, typiied by modiication of the “transformation of 
nature” concept, prevented the progress of the actual developmental policy, which 
explicitly bears evidence of the declining legitimacy of “socialist modernization.” 
The Brezhnev era is a crucial period in this argument, and this paper will evince one 
of the key elements of the Brezhnev authorities: “political indecisiveness.”
Various scholars have already discussed the “transformation of nature” 
concept and its actual establishment. The pioneering works of Marshall Goldman 
and Zhores Medvedev still have academic signiicance today.7 philip pryde 
concurrently touched upon various aspects of “conservation” in the Soviet Union 
while mentioning some of the conceptual background.8 Stephen Brain’s work 
concentrates upon the conceptual change in forest management from the second 
half of the nineteenth century up to the end of “Stalin’s Plan for Transformation of 
Nature.”9 Douglas R. Weiner also touches upon the concept, but his main academic 
interest is more in the Soviet‑Russian nature protection discourses and movements.10 
Julia Obertreis portrayed the colonial history of Central Asia from the tsarist period 
until the demise of the U.S.S.R., mentioning the actual situation of “transformation 
of nature” and “nature protection” in Uzbekistan.11 The above‑cited Paul Josephson 
7. Marshall I. Goldman, The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972); Zhores A. Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 145‑150; Zh.A. Medvedev, vzlёt i padenie lysenko [The Rise and Fall of Lysenko] (M.: Kniga, 1993), 197‑209. 
8. Philip R. Pryde, Conservation in the soviet union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
9. Stephen Brain, Song of the Forest: Russian Forestry and Stalinist Environmentalism, 1905‑1953 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2011).
10. Douglas R. Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
11. Iu. Obertrais, “‘Mertvye’ i ‘kul´turnye’ zemli: Diskursy uchënykh i imperskaia politika v Srednei Azii, 1880‑e–1991 gg. [The “Dead” and “Cultured” Lands: Scientists’ Discourses and Imperial Policy in Central Asia, 1880s‑1991],” Ab Imperio, no. 4 (2008): 191‑231.
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made a comparative analysis of modernization between the soviet union and 
the United States, referring to the “transformation of nature” concept during 
the post‑war Stalin era and construction of dams in the Volga River basin.12 
Compared with these previous studies, this article is unique in its explanation of the 
linkage between the developmental concept and actual development in a concrete 
region of the Soviet Union by use of archival materials in Moscow and Almaty as 
well as Soviet periodicals and monographs.
The “transformation of nature” concept and its modifications
While various embryonic ideas leading afterwards to the “transformation of 
nature” concept had already been expressed by Russian intellectuals at the end 
of the nineteenth century, it was only after the October Revolution that Soviet 
intellectuals further enriched the debate about the anthropogenic transformation 
of nature. Eventually, Marxist philosophers and Soviet geographers elaborated the 
concept after World War II with the start of “Stalin’s Plan for Transformation of 
Nature” in 1948 that human beings could maximally utilize natural “productive 
forces” for their own sake, which became possible only under socialism. For them, 
“humans” and “nature” develop not independently, but “dialectically” with close, 
strong interactions. As Ivan Ivanov‑Omskii, a Marxist philosopher, said, “Only 
socialist states are able to utilize the geographical environment effectively and 
transform it rationally on the basis of accurate scientiic data,” which “ensures new 
speed of increase of human dominion over nature.”13
Stalin’s Plan for Transformation of Nature consisted of certain components: 
creation of shelter belts to the west of the Ural River; tree planting around 
sovkhoz‑kolkhoz plots; construction of ponds and cisterns for local amelioration; 
and introduction of the grassland system of agriculture with crop‑fodder rotation 
on plots. Here, Troim Lysenko, the notorious Lamarckian agronomist, jumped on 
the bandwagon with the theory of “cluster planting of trees,” whose ineffectiveness 
and lack of foundation afterwards became apparent.14 In 1950, Iosif Stalin further 
put into practice “Great Constructions of Communism” projects in the framework 
of the Stalin’s Plan, including the construction of the famous Volga‑Don Canal, 
Stalingrad, and Kuibyshev Hydroelectric Stations in the Volga River basin and 
so on. The most grandiose project was the Major Turkmen Canal, running across 
the Karakum Desert through the dried up former riverbed of the Uzboi for around 
1,100 kilometers with two water reservoirs and hydroelectric stations on the path 
to the Caspian Sea. Stalin decided the construction on his own authority without 
12. Josephson, Industrialized Nature, Chapter 1.
13. I.I.  Ivanov‑Omskii, Istoricheskii materialism o roli geografiicheskoi sredy v razvitii 
obshchestva [Historical materialism and the role of geographic environment in the development of society] (M.: Politizdat, 1950), 152‑153.
14. Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, 145‑146.
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any feasibility study. The Major Turkmen Canal should have served for desert 
irrigation for pasturage in the Karakum Desert with tree or shrub planting along the 
canal, inally contributing to alleviation of the desert climate.15 soviet hydrologists 
calculated the effects on the water balances of the Aral Sea as a result of the canal 
construction, which promised a drop in the sea level.16
Stephen Brain described the confrontation between “technocrats” and 
“prometheans” of forest management during the Stalin’s Plan. The former respected 
“local variation, natural limits, and the importance of experimental results,” while 
the latter consisted of Lysenkoists, who forced all to introduce a uniform method 
of forestry irrespective of geographic conditions, advanced “the notion that forests 
could be made to conform to the human will and relied upon ideological claims to 
back up their beliefs.”17 Soviet geographers held diverse views on the human‑nature 
relationship and nature transformation, and each can be placed somewhere in 
between. In general, Soviet geographers both in Moscow and Leningrad succeeded 
in protecting the independence of the geographical sciences in the soviet union, 
not giving in to Lysenko’s “uniform” approach to nature.18
In March 1953 immediately after Stalin’s death, the Soviet authorities abruptly 
shut down obviously reckless nature transformation projects. The Major Turkmen 
Canal project was also abandoned. Excavation of the main canal had started only 
ive days before Stalin’s death.19 Soviet intellectuals temporarily ceased to refer to 
transformation of nature under the wave of “de‑Stalinization” in Soviet society.
Soviet geographers and “naturalists” engaged in the legislation process of the 
Nature Protection Law of the R.S.F.S.R., adopted at the Supreme Soviet in 1960. 
Here, they called for “nature protection through its enrichment.”20 This idea led 
15. Tetsuro Chida, “Sengo Starin‑ki Torukumenisutan ni okeru Unga Kensetsu Keikaku to Araru‑kai Mondai [Grandiose Canal Construction Projects in Turkmenistan and the Aral Sea Problem in the Post‑War Stalin Period],” Surabu Kenkyuu [Slavic Studies], 56 (June 2009): 17 [in Japanese].
16. Boris Zaikov, a Soviet hydrologist, calculated that the level of the Aral Sea would decline as much as 7.73 meters if the Major Turkmen Canal took 375‑400 m/sec in its first phase, and as much as 14.2 meters under the withdrawal of 600 m/sec in the future. Boris Zaikov, vodnyi balans i uroven´ Aral´skogo moria v sviazi so stroitel´stvom Glavnogo turukemnskogo kanala [The Water balance and the level of the Aral Sea after the construction of the Major Turkmen Canal] (L., 1952), 33‑34.
17. Stephan Brain, songs of the Forest, 141.
18. The author previously discussed the conceptual debates related to “space” and “region (geographical zone)” among Soviet geographers in the post‑war Stalin period, which clealy distanced themselves of the “uniformed” approach to nature by Lysenkovists and put a high value to the diversity of landscapes and geographical environments. Tetsuro Chida, “Taminzoku Ryouiki Teikoku Soren ni okeru Chirigaku to Kuukan‑Chiiki Ninshiki: Sengo Starin‑ki wo Chuushinni [Geographical Science and the Conception of ‘Region’ and ‘Space’ in the Soviet Union as a Multinational ‘Territorial’ Empire],” Chiiki Kenkyuu [Regional Studies], 10, 2 (April, 2010): 119‑121 [in Japanese].
19. “Nachalos´ general´noe nastuplenie na Kara‑Kumy! Skrepery vyshli na osnovnuiu trassu kanala [A general offensive into the Kara‑Kum got underway! Scrapers came to the main track of the canal],” Turkmenskaia iskra (04 March 1953): 1.
20. Weiner, A little Corner of Freedom, 265.
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directly to a revised concept of “transformation of nature,” which the geographers 
of the Institute of Geography, U.S.S.R. Academy of Science, brought back in 1956 
under the initiative of the Institute head, Innokenti Gerasimov.21 They did not 
initially use the term “transformation of nature (preobrazovanie prirody),” which 
evoked Stalinism, but “thermal and water regime on the earth’s surface and its 
transformation for practical purposes.” They argued that agricultural crops should 
be produced in accordance with geographic zones and natural conditions, and that 
“science and practice designed the techniques, aimed at transformation of natural 
processes for the purpose of alteration of the thermal‑moisture regime in certain 
territories and its better adjustment to the necessities of agriculture.”22
In 1960, Gerasimov argued that it should be one of the main tasks of the Institute 
to conduct “scholarly researches about the object‑oriented transformation of natural 
conditions and the full‑ledged usage of natural power to enhance productive forces 
of the socialist national economy.”23 In 1961, the “transformation of nature in the 
Soviet Union and her neighbouring countries” became the key research task of 
the Institute, which Gerasimov and Andrei Grigor´ev, the former director of the 
Institute until 1950,  got to lead.24
In general, the ongoing scientiic and technological revolutions encouraged 
them to be optimistic about human capacity in nature transformation with its 
protection and enrichment, which prompted them to bring the concept to the fore 
again. Gerasimov wrote in the annual research program of the Institute in 1961 
that “in our times of technological progress, especially in the ield of nuclear 
energy and its use for peaceful purposes, mankind will be able to proceed with 
international‑scale coordinated activities of radical transformations of nature for 
his own sake, focusing upon object‑oriented changes of natural balance of heat and 
21. Gerasimov became the director of the Institute from 1950 and worked out until his death in March 1985. He was initially a geomorphologist and played an active role in geographical and geological expeditions in Central Asia and Kazakhstan during 1930s including around Lake Balkhash.
22. Their argument became the conceptual background to Khrushchev’s policy of regional agricultural specialization. I.P. Gerasimov, “Teplovoi i vodnyi rezhim zemnoi poverkhnosti, ego rol´ v dinamike prirodnykh protsessov, geograficheskie razlichiia i metody preobrazovaniia dliia prakticheskikh tselei [Thermal and water regime of the Earth’s surface, its role in the dynamics of natural processes, geographic differences and methods of transformation of nature for practical purposes],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia geograficheskaia, no. 4 (1956): 47‑49.
23. I.P.  Gerasimov, “Geografiia v Sovetskom Soiuze (vvedenie) [Geography in the Soviet Union (preface)],” I.P. Gerasimov et al., eds., Sovetskaia geografiia. Itogi i zadachi [soviet geography: results and tasks] (M.: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel´stvo geograficheskoi literatury, 1960): 10.
24. ARAN (Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk [Archive of Russian Academy of Sciences]), f.  200, Institut geografii [Institute of Geogpraphy], op.  1, Upravlencheskaia dokumentatsiia Instituta [Administrative documentation of the Institute], d.  155, Plan nauchno‑issledovatel´skikh rabot Instituta na 1961 god [The annual research plan of the Institute], l. 16, Plan nauchno‑issledovatel´skikh rabot Problemy “Teoriia preobrazovaniia prirody SSSR i prilegaiushchikh territorii [The research plan on the problems “Theories of transformation of nature in the U.S.S.R. and adjacent territories”].
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moisture inherent in various natural‑climatic zones and large regions.”25 From 1961, 
the bimonthly journal of the Institute of Geography, Proceedings of the U.S.S.R. 
Academy of Sciences, Geographical Series, started to place a specialized section 
entitled “Natural Resources, Protection and Transformation of Nature” in almost 
every number. Gerasimov described the theoretical development of transformation 
of nature as the “vanguard areas of geographic sciences,”26 but, at the same time, 
he did not conceal his conviction about the capabilities of the Soviet Union to put 
grandiose projects of transformation of nature into full‑ledged execution. More 
speciically, Gerasimov apparently endorsed the idea about the death of the Aral 
Sea as a result of the irrigation development and water reservoir construction in the 
basin, insisting that “Central Asia is characterized by a closed hydrologic circle, 
which can be further developed by increase of evaporation, given the expansion of 
irrigated plots in the foothill and desert areas.”27
However, the Moscow‑based geographers signiicantly modiied the 
“transformation of nature” concept afterwards. They did not suppose it to be the endless 
process of “development” of humans and nature, but insisted that human beings 
should beforehand take into account “feedback” from the environment subjected to 
transformation. That is, Soviet geographers still agreed with human‑induced nature 
transformation itself, but at the same time thought that people should approach 
landscapes affected by transformation by calculating both “positive” and “negative” 
effects. Il’ia Novik, a specialist in cybernetics and the human‑nature relationship at 
the Institute of Philosophy, called this conceptual modiication the “cybernetization 
of the natural system,” of which Gerasimov expressed his approval.28
In February 1965, that is, after the dawn of the Brezhnev period, Vsevolod 
Anuchin, a geographer at Moscow State University and a leading advocate of 
uniication of physical and economic geographic disciplines (“uniied geography”), 
published an acrimonious article in Literaturnaia Gazeta, the oficial paper of 
the Writers’ Union of the U.S.S.R. Then, he severely accused Gerasimov and the 
Institute of Geography that, allegedly, they were not able to gain a comprehensive 
grasp of the relationship between nature and society, giving a high place only to 
physical geography and driving out economic geography and landscape science 
(landshaftvedenie) from the Institute. Anuchin pinned the label of “antigeograizm” 
to the academic stance of the Institute of Geography.29 Gerasimov forthwith made 
25. ARAN, f. 200, op. 1, d. 155, l. 7‑8, Vvedenie k planu nauchno‑issledovatel´skikh rabot [Introduction of the annual research plan].
26. I.P.  Gerasimov, “Sovetskaia geograficheskaia nauka i problem preobrazovaniia prirody [The Soviet geographic science and the problem of transformation of nature],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia geograficheskaia, no. 5 (1961): 7.
27. Gerasimov, “Sovietskaia geograficheskaia nauka,” 11‑12.
28. A.G. Doskach, “Nauki o Zemle i voprosy preobrazovaniia prirody [Earth sciences and the issues on transformation of nature],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia geograficheskaia, no. 5 (1962): 136.
29. V.  Anuchin, “Istoriia s geografiei [History with geography],” Literaturnaia gazeta (18 February 1965), 2.
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a written protestation against Anuchin and condemned his criticism as baseless, 
introducing various examples of new directions and results of economic geographers 
and landscape specialists at the Institute, stating that “the study about the geographic 
aspects of the interrelationship between nature and society now became a core task 
of the Institute.”30 Anuchin’s harsh criticism seemed to make Gerasimov recognize 
the necessity to elaborate a grand theory of geographic sciences as soon as possible, 
which inally resulted in the introduction by Gerasimov of the “constructive 
geography” theory in 1966, which urged geographers to investigate triadic subjects 
concurrently: systematic transformation of nature, rational industrial distribution, 
and migration movement and ideal population disposition. Gerasimov emphasized 
that “the combination of these triadic subjects guaranteed the indispensable 
‘economization’ of the geographical sciences as a whole,” which responded to the 
criticism by Anuchin.31
Across the second half of the 1960s, Gerasimov slightly changed his approach 
to actual conditions around the “transformation of nature” concept. For example, in 
1967, Gerasimov recognized that the above‑mentioned “closed hydrologic circle” 
in Central Asia had not been scientiically evinced by exact calculations,” opining 
that “the problems about water balances in Central Asia are quite complicated 
and include a number of very important but still‑unsettled scientiic‑technological 
issues.”32 At last, in 1969, Gerasimov admitted that the future of the Aral Sea was 
becoming an “imminent issue.” He further demanded that Soviet geographers 
conduct wholesale investigations and analyses of the basin, without which it 
would be impossible to set a clear vision about the correct solution to the Aral Sea 
problems.33 At the same time, he insisted that planners should beforehand factor into 
the budget the costs for prevention or elimination of “negative effects,” emanating 
from nature transformations.34 He further stated that “under contemporary conditions 
the conservation of nature is becoming inseparable from its transformation, from 
the rational exploitation of its resources.”35 What is important here is the fact that 
Gerasimov’s article was published in the most authoritative journal of the C.P.S.U., 
Kommunist, which meant that Gerasimov’s concept received oficial endorsement 
from the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.
30. I. Gerasimov, “‘Ischezla’ li geografiia? [Did geography “disappear”?]” Literaturnaia 
gazeta (29 April 1965), 2; in addition to Gerasimov, six scholars (of four articles), all of whom were based in either the Institute of Geography or Moscow State University, openly debated in the paper.
31. Gerasimov, “Konstruktivnaia geografiia: tseli, metody, rezul´taty [Constructive geography: purposes, methods and results],” Izvestiia Vsesoiuznogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, no. 5 (1966): 393.
32. I.P. Gerasimov, Preobrazovanie prirody i razvitie geograficheskoi nauki v SSSR. Ocherki po konstruktivnoi geografii [Transformation of nature and the development of geographic sciences in the USSR. The overview of constructive geography] (M.: Znanie, 1967): 72.
33. I.P.  Gerasimov, “Nuzhen general´nyi plan preobrazovaniia prirody nashei strany [Our country needs master plan of transformation of nature],” Kommunist, no. 2 (1969): 77.
34. Gerasimov, “Nuzhen general´noi plan,” 69.
35. Gerasimov, “Nuzhen general´noi plan,” 78.
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During the 1970s, Soviet geographers paid more attention to “ecology” as with 
the case of the West, although it was still anthropocentric for many, requiring 
the optimization of the human‑nature relationship and harmonization between 
economic development and environmental factors. Given such conditions, Vladimir 
Preobrazhenskii and Lev Abramov, geographers close to Gerasimov, even issued 
a warning about the destruction of the “society‑nature system” as a result of 
human activities, armed with mighty high‑technologies.36 Gerasimov pleaded no 
contestation against the “struggles for nature protection by progressive public opinion 
in capitalistic countries,” despite his strong emphasis on the superiority of socialism 
over the issues of target‑oriented nature protection through its transformation.37 
Gerasimov remained cautious as to the full‑ledged implementation of one of 
the most gigantic nature transformation projects in the entire world, the Siberian 
water diversion to Central Asia. He insisted in 1982 that it is “impossible to 
conduct any transformation of nature without negative side effects. […] The 
Asiatic diversion does not meet demands, which necessitates further all‑round 
researches, including about alternative measures.”38 He persisted, on a scientiic 
basis, about negative feedback from the actual transformations of nature up to the 
end of his life. Gerasimov with Grigorii Voropaev, the director of the Institute of 
Water Problems in Moscow, even pointed out that the planned quantity of water 
for diversion in the project document of the irst phase was not enough to prevent 
the process of desertiication around the Aral Sea. They alternatively proposed 
to enhance the eficiency of local water use through reconstruction of irrigation 
networks and other measures.39 
In sum, the “transformation of nature” concept went through signiicant 
modiication before and after 1960. Gerasimov, the most voiceful proponent of 
the modiied version of the “transformation of nature” concept, assumed it to be 
the all‑embracive balanced notion of “development” and “conservation,” which 
pursued concurrent ensuring of actual nature transformation, rational use of natural 
resources, nature protection, and socioeconomic prosperity of people. He obviously 
raised the bar for the on‑site realization of the concept. This was the conceptual 
aspect of “relexive modernization” in the Soviet Union during Brezhnev’s time.
36. V.S.  Preobrazhenskii i L.S.  Abramov, “Stanovlenie konstruktivnoi geografii [The establishment of constructive geography],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia 
geograficheskaia, no. 1 (1976): 15.
37. I.P. Gerasimov, “Vzaimodeistvie prirody i obshchestva i zadachi konstruktivnoi geografii [Interaction between nature and society and the tasks of constructive geography],” in I.B. Novik, ed., problemy optimizatsii v ėkonomiki [problems of optimization in economy] (M.: Nauka, 1978), 13‑14.
38. ARAN, f. 1850, Lichnyi fond Gerasimova Innokentiia Petrovicha (1905‑1985) [Collections of personal documents of Gerasimov Innokentii Petrovich (1905‑1985)], op. 1, d. 192, l.  11, Zapiska Gerasimova “O materialakh, sviazannykh s perebroskoi stoka sibirskikh i severnykh rek na iug [Report by Gerasimov about the diversion of Siberian and northern rivers into the south].”
39. G.V.  Voropaev, I.P.  Gerasimov, O.K.  Kibal´chich and N.I.  Koronkevich, “Problema pereraspredeleniia vodnykh resursov v Sredinnom regione: prognoz izmeneniia prirodnykh uslovii [The problem of the redistribution of water resources in the Central region: forcast of translation of natural conditions],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia geograficheskaia, no. 6 (1982): 25‑26.
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“Transformation of nature” and the fate of Lake Balkhash
Lake Balkhash is a unique inland water body with a surface area of 16,400 km2 
located in the southeastern part of Kazakhstan, and it can be divided into the 
saline east Balkhash and the freshwater West Balkhash at the narrow strait in 
the center, called Uzyn‑Aral. The Ili River supplies more than 70 percent of water 
inlow into Lake Balkhash. Four small rivers, Karatar, Aksu, Lepsy, and Ayagoz, 
low into the East Balkhash. The altitude of Lake Balkhash depends upon the 
inlow volume of the rivers and luctuates periodically. Owing to the constant 
supply of freshwater from the Ili River, the salinity of the West Balkhash is low, 
at a level for possible industrial use, which gives economic signiicance to Lake 
Balkhash. The precondition of water use was completely different from that of the 
Aral Sea, illed with economically less valuable brackish water, inside which local 
people engaged in ishery and water transportation. Balkhash City, one of the 
centers of non‑ferrous metallurgy in Kazakhstan, is located on the northwestern 
shore of Lake Balkhash, which is the main consumer of water resources in the 
West Balkhash. The total area of the basin extends up to 410,000 km2, and includes 
China, Kazakhstan, and a small terrain of Kyrgyzstan. The largest river, Ili, is a 
transboundary waterway between the upstream People’s Republic of China and 
the downstream Republic of Kazakhstan. However, this article concentrates upon 
the cases in the territory of the former U.S.S.R.
Kapchagai Hydropower station and irrigation development
Irrigated agriculture had been conducted from old times upstream of the Ili River 
in today’s People’s Republic of China. On the other hand, local Kazakhs in the 
Zhetysu (Semirechie) region had been nomadic or semi‑nomadic and full‑scale 
agricultural development started after Russian colonizers settled there. However, 
it was only at the end of the 1920s that Soviet intellectuals and engineers began 
seriously considering the future development of the basin. Experimental rice 
cultivation along the Karatal River was introduced in 1930,40 which shifted into full 
gear only after the deportation of Koreans from the Far East in 1937. As for the Ili 
River basin, scholars of the Central Asian State University in Tashkent conducted 
an expeditionary investigation in the downstream area of the Ili River in 1926 and 
1927, which concluded that there existed 500,000 hectares of arable land including 
45,000 hectares in the Akdala area, suitable for rice cultivation through irrigation.41 
These “500,000” and “45,000 hectares” would be the fundamental indicators for 
the future planning of agricultural development in this area. According to Dmitrii 
40. P.F.  Domrachev, Balkhash i Pribalkhash´e [Lake Balkhash and its surroundings] (Alma‑Ata: Kazakhskoe kraevoe izdatel´stvo, 1935): 53.
41. M.M. Nedzvetskii, “Irrigatsionnye izyskaniia v Pribalkhash´i [Surveys on irrigation around Lake Balkhash],” narodnoe khoziaistvo Kazakhstana, no. 4‑5 (1929), 53, 58.
 sCIenCe, DevelopmenT AnD moDernIzATIon In THe BrezHnev TIme  249
Bukinich, an irrigation engineer who headed various geographic expeditions in 
Central Asia, mongolia, and Afghanistan, there was no other crop except for 
rice suitable for this region because of the prevalence of saline soil.42 They also 
presented the embryonic idea of constructing the Kapchagai Hydropower Station.43
A full‑ledged study for water development of the Ili River was organized only 
during World War II when many industrial facilities evacuated into the Semirechie, 
which in turn suffered a shortage of electricity.44 The permanent Ili Comprehensive 
expedition (postoianno deistvuiushchaia Iliiskaia kompleksnaia ėkspeditsiia) was 
organized in 1944, headed by Shaik Chokin, the director of the Institute of Energy 
of Kazakh S.S.R.45 They made the primary project document of the Kapchagai 
Reservoir. Interestingly, they held a negative view on the gigantic irrigation 
development downstream of the Ili River.46 Finally, in 1959, the project document 
(today’s “feasibility study”) of the Kapchagai Hydropower Station was submitted 
and widely acclaimed by the the Gosplan Council for Techno‑Economic Assessment 
(expert Commission)47 in Moscow after its modiication by the All‑Union Project 
Designing and Research Institute of Water Facilities Construction (Gidroproekt).48 
The Kapchagai Reservoir itself was not an eficient hydraulic facility because of 
its low percentage (23.5 percent) of planned effective water volume. The installed 
capacity of the hydropower station was only 360 MW, almost ten times less than the 
Nurek Hydropower Station in Tajikistan (3,000 MW).49 According to the project 
document, the Kapchagai dam would store more than double the volume (28.1 km3) 
42. Domrachev, Balkhash i Pribalkhash´e, 53.
43. Nedzvetskii, “Irrigatsionnye izyskaniia v Pribalkhash´i,” 55.
44. Sh.Ch. Chokin, Chetyre vremeni zhizni [Four times of life] (Almaty: Bilim, 1998): 190.
45. Chokin afterward became president of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakh S.S.R. (1964‑1967).
46. V.L. Tsenatsevich and V.A. Kiktenko, “Perspektivy razvitiia irrigatsii v basseine r. Ili [The perspectives on the irrigational development in the Ili River basin],” in Sh.Ch. Chokin, ed., Problema vodokhoziaistvennogo ispol´zovaniia reki Ili [The problem about the water use of the Ili River] (Alma‑Ata: Izdatel´stvo Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, 1950): 71‑72.
47. The Council for Techno‑Economic Assessment (later the State Expert Commission) was the permanent organ within the All‑Union State Planning Committee (Gosplan), whose role was to make assessments of the feasibility studies of the developmental projects, which held strategic importance at a national level. The Expertise Sub‑Commission was organized to each project, and members of the Sub‑Commission were further divided into groups by subjects. Each group made an assessment from a perspective of its specialty, and finally, all documents were assembled and summarized to a final assessment report. The permanent Council (or Expertise Commission) finally adopted an official resolution based on the final assessment report by the Sub‑Commission. The resolution would be used as information in making a final decision of each project in Gosplan and the Council of Ministers.
48. RGAE (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv konomiki [Russian State Archive of Economics]), f.  4372, op.  58, 1957‑1959  gg., d.  670, Ob kspertize proektnogo zadaniia Kapchagaiskoi G S [About the experts’ assessment concerning the project document of the Kapchagai Hydropower Station], l. 186, Postanovlenie Soveta tekhniko‑ konomicheskoi kspertizy [The resolution of the Council for Techno‑Economic Expertise] (18.07.1959).
49. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 58, d. 670, l. 70, Zakliuchenie po razdelam nergetiki [The conclusion about the power engineering section].
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of the annual average water outlow from the dam (11.8 km3). Chokin wrote in 
his memoir that the Kapchagai Reservoir should have been “an instrument for the 
regulation of long‑term luctuations of river low, and could be the regulator of the 
surface level and water regime of Lake Balkhash.”50 The instability of the altitude 
and salinity of Lake Balkhash inluenced the water supply to Balkhash City and 
other settlements around the lake. Yet the Gosplan expert Commission proposed 
another variant of water use, which seemed to be “economically” more eficient, 
urging Gidroproekt “to accelerate the designing of the single comprehensive 
scheme of land‑water usage in the downstream area of the Ili River and to clarify 
the inluence of the water reservoir upon the development of agriculture and 
animal breeding.”51
In the Aral Sea basin, the Karakum Canal started operation of its irst‑phase 
section in 1959 and of its second‑phase section in 1960. As during the Stalin era, 
the myth of “gigantism” still remained popular and inluential among some tiers 
of Soviet intelligentsia and bureaucrats. In 1959, Nikolai Kalachёv, a hydraulic 
engineer of the Institute of Energy of Kazakh S.S.R. and a colleague of the 
above‑mentioned Chokin, succeeded in publishing a written proposal in the 
high‑impact journal of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (Bulletin 
of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences) about the construction of an artiicial 
channel with four hydroelectric stations, connecting the Ili River with the Chu 
River (transboundary river between today’s Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, lowing 
east of the Ili River), for the irrigation development of 3,500,000 hectares in the 
Bet‑Pak‑Dala Desert region. As Kalachёv clearly designated, Lake Balkhash would 
have been divided into areas of small water bodies after this channel had started full 
operation in a distant future.52 He once again propagated his idea at a conference 
on comprehensive usage of land‑water resources in the Central Asian republics 
and southern Kazakhstan in May 1962.53 However, the Soviet authorities alone 
seemed to dismiss this sort of nothing‑but‑gigantic project without any feasibility 
demonstration. The mere “massiveness” or the unrealistic transformation of deserts 
had ceased to appeal in the developmental designing of the U.S.S.R. Rather, Soviet 
planners came to demand a Soviet version of “feasibility” and scientiic basis.
In 1964, the hydraulic engineers of the Kazakh branch of Gidroproekt 
(Kazgidroproekt) worked out another project document about the irrigation of 
“430,000 hectares” around the delta zone of the Ili River mainly for rice‑pasture 
rotation (110,000 hectares for rice cultivation), almost at the same time that 
50. Chokin, Chetyre vremeni zhizni, 195.
51. RGAE, f.  4372, op.  58, d.  670, l.  217, Zakliuchenie kspertnoi (pod)komissii [The conclusion of the experts’ subcommission] (l. 189‑218).
52. N.S. Kalachёv, “Kompleksnye issledovaniia v basseine reki Ili [Comprehensive studies about the Ili Rvier basin],” Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, no. 5 (1959): 115‑118.
53. A.S.  Kes´, “Soveshchanie po kompleksnomu ispol´zovaniiu zemel´nykh i vodnykh resursov respublik Srednei Azii i Iuzhnogo Kazakhstana [The meeting on comprehensive use of land and water resources in Central Asia and the South Kazakhstan],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia geograficheskaia, no. 5 (1962): 193.
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the Soviet government oficially gave inal approval for the construction of 
the Kapchagai Hydropower Station. The irrigated area would be limited up to 
100,000 hectares under natural conditions including 20,000 for rice cultivation with 
consideration given to irrigation development in the upstream area in Kazakhstan 
and China and conservation of muskrat breeding in the delta area.54 It could have 
been possible to cultivate “430,000 hectares” only if the whole volume of water 
resources of the Ili River had been used for irrigation with long‑term and seasonal 
control by the Kapchagai Reservoir. The project premised the probable elimination 
of Lake Balkhash in the future.
The State Expert Commission of Gosplan began the assessment process in March 
1965. The inal report of the Expert Sub‑Commission encompassed the obviously 
conlicting opinions of its members, which were split between “pro‑development” and 
“anti‑development” regarding gigantic melioration measures. On the one hand, the 
inal report demanded expansion of the area of rice cultivation up to 33 or 40 percent 
of the whole irrigated land, not the 25 percent proposed in the project document,55 
although the standard irrigation demand for rice (20,000  m3/ha) is four to ive 
times more than that for other crops.56 One member of the Expert Sub‑Commission 
suggested a further investigation into the possibility of irrigation development not 
only in the downstream sites below Akdala, but also on uncultivated lands between 
Kapchagai and Akdala.57 On the other hand, the inal report further mentioned that 
in a distant future, Lake Balkhash will cease to exist if the hydromelioration measures in the scheme are implemented fully. […] The Expert Sub‑Commission thinks that it should be a subject for broad public discussion in the Republic whether the complete disappearance of Lake Balkhash is admissible or not.58 
vadim Dёzhkin, a biologist and specialist in hunting from the Central Union 
of Consumers’ Societies, expressed this view to the Expert Sub‑Commission.59 
54. Muskrats are valuable fur animals to make fur coats and caps, introduced from the North America and Scandinavia to the Ili River delta in the 1930s. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, 1965‑1975  gg., d.  466, Materialy kspertizy skhemy gidromeliorativnykh meropriiatii dlia razvitiia sel´skogo khoziaistva i zverovodstva v nizov´iakh r. Ili [Materials of the experts’ assessment about the scheme of hydromelioration measures for the development of agriculture and animal breeding in the lower reaches of the Ili River], l. 120, Postanovlenie Gos kspertizy [The resolution of the State Expertise] (24.04.1965) (l. 120‑125), 130, Zakliuchenie kspertnoi podkomissii [The conclusion of the Experts’ Subcommission] (10.04.1965) (l. 126‑144).
55. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 466, l. 131.
56. Tekhniko‑ konomicheskii doklad sravnitel´noi konomicheskoi ffektivnosti i ocherёdnosti orosheniia zemel´ pod risoseianie v perspektivnykh raionakh SSSR [The techno‑economic report about the comparative economic analysis of the effectiveness and preference of irrigation for rice cultivation in the promising regions in the U.S.S.R.] (M., 1968), 37.
57. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 466, l. 137.
58. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 466, l. 133.
59. The Central Union of Consumers’ Societies was the competent agency of hunting of wild animals including muskrats. Its Kazakh branch was responsible for animal hunting in the delta area of the Ili River.
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He made an assessment of the project document over the future perspective of 
muskrat hunting in the delta area. What is critical is that the Commission heard and 
accepted his harsh criticism against the project. He further states in his assessment 
report the following:
The author of the scheme takes one‑sided approach to the consequences of the complete drying up of Lake Balkhash, measuring them only through expected economic effects. The disappearance of the vast water surface of Balkhash is bound to lead negative climatic changes of northern Kazakhstan and deterioration of living conditions in the cities and towns around Balkhash. Neither must we forget about the great historical and aesthetic values of the lake. We are obliged to categorically cast doubt on the righteousness of the designers’ task in making a scheme for the full use of the delta zone of the Ili River for irrigation. Comprehensive economic development of this area should include agriculture (in less than the estimated area) in conjunction with hunting and ishery as well as keeping part of the valuable natural system intact.60
This statement corresponded well with the arguments, elected by “naturalists” of 
that time, as given in the above‑cited Douglas Weiner’s work. In fact, Dёzhkin 
himself pursued his career at the state nature reserve in Voronezh. However, the 
important point here is that he did not oppose agricultural development as a whole, 
but appealed as to the necessity of its coexistence with other economic sectors.
Lake Balkhash and the delta areas of its basin were also important for ishery. 
Accordingly, it was quite natural that V. Dashenkin, a Sub‑Commission member 
representing the ishery sector, severely accused Gidroproekt that no ishery 
specialist took part in the designing work and that no compensation measures were 
considered for the damage to the ishery sector inlicted by ecological degradation 
in the basin as a result of the agricultural development. He resoundingly proclaimed 
that “we must not agree to the disappearance of Lake Balkhash in the future.”61 
In addition, an expert in livestock breeding also demanded rewriting of the project 
document, complaining of its sketchiness about the feasibility of developing 
transhumance in the delta area.62 Thus, specialists in three important economic 
sectors downstream of the Ili river and in lake Balkhash made critical reviews 
of the project document. Furthermore, several experts condemned the ignorance 
about the negative effects on industrial and domestic waters caused by the irrigation 
development, although no representative of the metallurgical industry in Balkhash 
City participated in the assessment processes. 
60. RGAE, f.  4372, op.  66, d.  466, l.  86‑87, Zakliuchenie po razdelu “zverovodstvo” [The conclusion about the “animal breeding” section] (24.03.1965).
61. The author could not find the detailed biography of Dashenkin. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 466, l. 96, Zakliuchenie po razdelu “rybokhoziaistvennye meropriiatiia” [The conclusion about the section of “measures for fishery”] (27.03.1965).
62. RGAE, f.  4372, op.  66, d.  466, l.  100‑105, Zakliuchenie po razdelu “obvodnenie” [The conclusion about the section of “watering of pastures”] (11.03.1965).
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Followed by the Expert Sub‑Commission’s inal report, the Gosplan Expert 
Commission at last rejected the perspective of future irrigation development on 
“43,000 hectares,” and demanded a “fundamental rewriting” of the project document. 
rather, it recommended to begin land reclamation in the Akdala area on no more 
than 40,000 or 50,000 hectares and to remake a project document for it.63 one of the 
reasons was the advantage of rice cultivation at the downstream sites of the Syr‑Darya 
River from the perspective of reclamation costs and farmers’ experiences. The Lake 
Balkhash basin was markedly inferior to the lower Syr‑Darya regarding these points. 
The second and more important factor was the invalidity of the data provided by the 
Gidroproect engineers. The project was not designed comprehensively, and did not 
take into consideration damages to other economic sectors (ishery, hunting, river 
transportation, and industrial and domestic water supply) as a result of the shrinkage 
of Lake Balkhash after the full‑ledged agricultural water development of the region.64 
That is, the Expert Sub‑Commission criticized the lack of investigation and analysis 
of the project document concerning negative feedback from the transformed nature 
to human activities. This way of thinking resonated quite well with the modiied 
version of the “transformation of nature” concept.
In fact, in 1961, Mark L´vovich, a hydrologist of the Institute of Geography in 
Moscow, emphasized the priority of agriculture over hydroelectric power generation 
in water development, saying that “in practice, the use of water for agricultural 
production (soil moisture, irrigation water) should take the irst place in the designing 
of the comprehensive planning for water usage.” He explicitly endorsed irrigation 
expansion in Central Asia, but at the same time did not forget to point out, 
It is important to take into consideration that to use one source of water inevitably inluences another source. [The Soviet] economic complex envisages distribution of waters properly to all sectors of the national economy on the basis of general national interests.65 
In 1964, Anatolii Korobov, the deputy chairman of the U.S.S.R. Gosplan, made 
a speech in front of Soviet geographers at the Fourth Congress of the All‑Union 
Geographic Society, accentuating 
the increasing role of transformation of nature by socialist society poses new challenges to geographic sciences. […] More and more scholar‑geographers are now being engaged in the preliminary studies about the development and disposition of productive forces in the U.S.S.R., and providing consultative support to our planning organs.66 
63. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 466, l. 124‑125.
64. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 466, l. 124‑125, 142‑144.
65. M.I.  L´vovich, “O kompleksnom ispol´zovanii i okhrane vodnykh resursov [Comprehensive use and conservation of water resources],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. 
seriia geograficheskaia, no. 2 (1961): 37, 39‑40.
66. A.V. Korobov, “Geografiia i khoziaistvo [Geography and economy],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia geograficheskaia, no. 4 (1964): 4‑5.
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As he mentioned in his speech, Gerasimov was a member of the Expert Commission 
of Gosplan at that time.67 Although the author did not ind any clue that geographers 
actually took part in the above‑mentioned assessment processes, it is certain that 
Gerasimov’s view on transformation of nature was shared with specialists in the 
Expert Commission in Gosplan.
It was not by chance that, at almost the same time as the above‑mentioned inal 
report was issued, the editorial board of the journal Proceedings of the U.S.S.R. 
Academy of Sciences, Geographical Series gave approval to publish one article about 
a future perspective on the industrial development around Lake Balkhash, written 
by an economic geographer of the Institute of Geography in Moscow, Mikhail 
Buianovskii. Although his main argument that Balkhash City should be the center of 
the steel industry in Kazakhstan with use of abundant freshwater resources was not 
brought to realization, his strong assertion did hit the mark that any developmental 
measure must not enhance the mineralization process of the lake. He even proposed 
that the Kapchagai Hydropower Station not be constructed. He further rightly warned 
that degradation of the delta area would lead to “complete destruction of reeds and 
muskrats” there, and that salinization of Lake Balkhash would be inevitable in 
the case of organizing irrigated agriculture in large areas, which “would cast the 
problem of the fate of Lake Balkhash into the future, analogous to the Aral Sea.”68 
It seemed that the “anti‑developmental” forces gained the upper hand in the case of 
the irrigational expansion as for the Lake Balkhash basin.
However, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in May 1966 
encouraged backing up further irrigational developments all over the Soviet Union, 
particularly for grain production including rice. Minister of Land Reclamation and 
Water Resources of the U.S.S.R., Evgenii Alekseevskii, declared that the Soviet 
Union would aim for 100 percent self‑suficiency in rice in spite of a 40 percent self‑ 
suficiency rate at that time.69 At the same Plenum, Masimkhan Beisebaev, the chairman 
of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh S.S.R., stated that Kazakhstan owned a 
tremendous potential for grandiose rice cultivation along the Syr‑Darya, Ili, Karatal, 
and Charyn Rivers. The latter three rivers are located in the Lake Balkhash basin.70 
The Plenum became an additional accelerator to start experimental irrigation 
in the Akdala area. In 1967, the central government decided to experimentally 
67. Korobov, “Geografiia i khoziaistvo,” 11.
68. M.S. Buianovskii, “Balkhash – Ili i vozmozhnost´ organizatsii krupnogo promyshlennogo kompleksa v Pribalkhash´e [The Balkhash‑Ili basin and the potential of the establishment of a large‑scale industrial complex around Lake Balkhash],” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR. Seriia 
geograficheskaia, no. 3 (1965): 61‑62.
69. RGANI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii [Russian State Archive of Contemporary History]), f. 2, Plenumy TsK KPSS [Plenums of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.], op. 3, Materialy Plenumov [Materials of Plenums], d. 9, Maiskii Plenum TsK KPSS (25‑27.05.1966). Stenogramma pervogo zasedaniia (25.05.1966). Nepravlennyi kzempliar [May Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (25‑27.05.1966). Shorthand record of the first session (25.05.1966). Unmodified copy], l. 28, Doklad Alekseevskogo E.E. [Report by Alekseevskii E.E.].
70. RGANI, f. 2, op. 3, d. 9, l. 130, Rech´ Beisebaeva M.
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organize two rice sovkhozes in the Akdala area under the direct control of the 
all‑union Ministry of Melioration and Water Economy. The authorities of Kazakh 
S.S.R. further lobbied for the prompt realization of rice cultivation in the lower 
reaches of the Ili River. In the same year, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the authoritative 
party head of Kazakhstan and candidate member of the Politburo in Moscow, sent 
a petition to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee to urge hydraulic engineers to inish 
constructing irrigation facilities (head work and a magisterial irrigation channel) 
and irrigated plots of 40,000 hectares in the Akdala area by 1973 at the latest, 
referring to the potential irrigation development in the lower reaches of the Ili river 
on “430,000 hectares” in the future.71
In 1968, the Gosplan Expert Commission approved the “Feasibility Report on 
the Comparative Cost Effectiveness and Priority of Irrigation for Rice Growing in 
Promising Regions of the U.S.S.R.,” made up of the All‑Union Project Designing 
Institute of Water and Amelioration Construction (Giprovodkhoz). This document 
admitted the “advantageous position” of the Akdala area for rice cultivation, 
but, at the same time, still mentioned the future potential for land melioration on 
430,000 hectares downstream of the Ili River. Furthermore, the report clearly stated 
that “in connection with the decrease of the inluent quantity to Lake Balkhash, we 
should take into account that, according to the available data, the eficiency of the 
current regime of the lake is insigniicant, and incomparable with the eficiency of 
the usage of the Ili River low for irrigation.”72 The local Kazakh authorities and 
the Soviet ameliorators had not given up the grandiose agricultural development in 
the Ili‑Balkhash basin. At that moment, in turn, the political back‑up for the 
expansion of irrigated farms by the Brezhnev regime seemed to be immovable.
Some geographers also gave support for irrigational development in the basin. 
In 1967, Viktor Shul´ts, a big name in hydrology in Tashkent, proposed a grandiose 
idea in a monograph entitled “Transformation of Nature in Central Asia,” edited by 
Gerasimov. He argued as follows: 
If we consider that relatively a lot of water is now lost in vain [by evaporation], it is possible to drain Lake Balkhash. After the completion of drainage, it will be easy to predict that we will gain the prospect of irrigating 14‑15 million hectares with use of our own water resources in Central Asia alone [including those of the Aral Sea basin].73 
71. AP RK (Arkhiv Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan [The President’s Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan]), f. 708, TsK KP Kazakhstana, op. 42, 1967 g., d. 194, Perepiska s TsK KPSS, l. 85‑86, Zapiska D. Kunaeva v TsK KPSS o stroitel´stve Akdalinskogo massiva orosheniia [Report by D. Kunaev to the Central Committee of the CPSU about the consolidation of irrigated lands in the Akdala area] (05.04.1967).
72. Tekhniko‑ėkonomicheskii doklad, 37.
73. V.L. Shul´ts, “Izuchennost´ vodnykh resursov Srednei Azii i puti ikh ispol´zovaniia [The research degree about water resources in Central Asia and the way of their usage],” in I.P. Gerasimov, A.S. Kes´ i V.N. Kunin, eds., problemy preobrazovaniia prirody srednei Azii [Problems about transformation of nature in Central Asia] (M.: Nauka, 1967): 67.
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Gerasimov also contributed an article with the general introduction of the book, 
in which he presented the vast area of cultivable lands through irrigation in 
Central Asia, as Shul’ts did, but, at the same time, he emphasized the dificulty 
of predicting what would happen after the implementation of developmental 
measures in the region, calling for the wholesale progress of scientiic researches 
on “the most effective ways of transformation of nature, and a forecast of changes 
of natural conditions instigated by the growing scale of technical measures.”74 
He also touched upon the necessity of accurate scientiic predictions about 
the future water balance of Lake Balkhash after the wholesale irrigational 
development in the basin. Here, Gerasimov held onto his “transformation of 
nature” concept.75
Once again, matters took a turn for the worse for the developers in 1969, 
when citizens in Balkhash City were whipped into a panic, since they felt serious 
misgivings as to the future shrinkage of Lake Balkhash and the potential depletion 
of drinking water as a result of the construction of the Kapchagai Reservoir 
and the irrigation development of the lower reaches of the Ili River. According 
to Nikolai Guliaev, the irst secretary of the Balkhash gorkom, a number of 
inhabitants began to leave the city.76 In response to this, the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan gave an order to publish an explanatory 
article in the republican newspaper to dispel citizens’ concerns until 15 September.77 
The mainstream of the Ili River inally closed on 28 September 1969. However, 
it was only on 12  November when R.  Sedykh, head of Kazgidroproekt, and 
B. Amosov, the chief engineer of the construction site of the hydropower station, 
published an account in the republican newspaper Kazakhstanskaia pravda. That 
is, they tried to excuse themselves, only after the situation became irreversible. In 
the article, they tried to address apprehensions over environmental degradation 
and deterioration of living conditions, asserting that the Kapchagai would bring 
win‑win results for all the stakeholders downstream of the Ili River, including 
ishery, livestock breeding, and muskrat hunting, through artiicial regulation 
of seasonal water discharge from the Kapchagai. They estimated the drawdown 
of Lake Balkhash to be only around 1 to 1.25 meters during impoundment into 
the water reservoir. As mentioned above, the water level of Lake Balkhash had 
74. I.P.  Gerasimov, “Nauchnye problemy preobrazovaniia prirody Srednei Azii dliia razvitiia oroshaemogo zemledeliia i pastbishchnogo zhivotnovodstva [Scientific issues on transformation of nature in Central Asia for the development of irrigation farming and pasturable livestock farming],” in Gerasimov et al., eds., problemy preobrazovaniia prirody, 15, 19. 
75. Gerasimov dealt with this topic about Lake Balkhash along with the Aral Sea. Gerasimov, “Nauchnye problemy,” 17‑18.
76. AP RK, f. 708, op. 46, 1969 g., d. 149, Informatsii obkomov, ministerstv i otdelov TsK 
[Information of provincial party committees, ministries and departments of the Central Committee], l. 18‑19, Ob usilenii volneniia zhitelei goroda Balkhasha [About intensification of unrest among residents of Balkhash City] (28.07.1969).
77. AP RK, f. 708, op. 46, d. 149, l. 69, Zapiska M. Fazylova o situatsii v g. Balkhashe [Report by M. Fazylov about the situation in Balkhash City] (03.09.1969).
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changed in the long term, depending upon the inlow volume from the rivers and 
precipitation. And they concluded that this level of drawdown was within the 
boundaries of natural luctuations of the lake.78 
However, the apology of the project representatives provoked open debates in 
Literaturnaia Gazeta, which Marshal Goldman concurrently referred to.79 ligii 
Stavskii, a naturalist writer, incited animadversions on the project. He inserted in 
his article the voice of Mikhail Gorodetskii, a department head of the Balkhash 
Copper‑Smelting Plant: 
“We need Lake [Balkhash] no less than air. […] You see that deserts are surrounding us. Then, where do we take waters if the lake will not exist?” 
Stavskii further condemned the ill‑preparedness of the project. Full‑ledged 
scientiic research about future water use and its impact on nature and human 
activities had only just begun. According to an oficial of Kazgiprovodkhoz, their 
result would be given only in 1972.80 Following this, the editorial board published 
a number of voices, which evidently defended the anti‑developmental opinions. 
One item of feedback to Stavskii’s article was really suggestive: 
We do not oppose the transformation of nature itself, but go against the one‑sided, bureaucratic, and unwise approach to it, against the violation of the comprehensive principle, and against any anti‑scientiic actions in the case of matters of nature.81 
By the beginning of the 1970s, this mentality, resonant with the modiied version 
of the “transformation of nature” concept, seemed to be widely shared with 
intellectuals, who developed a keen interest in nature. At the same time, it should 
be added that there was no consensus around what was “scientiic.” 
At last, Ufa Akhmedsain, the most authoritative hydrogeologist in the 
Republic and a full member of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakh S.S.R., raised 
an alarm over the optimistic estimations about the drawdown of Lake Balkhash. 
He calculated that if irrigated plots were developed up to 50,000 hectares until 
1978, then 57 percent of the annual water low of the Ili River would be lost in the 
Kapchagai and for irrigation. As a result, according to him, the altitude of Lake 
Balkhash would drop by as much as 2.5 meters (not 1.25 meters as Sedykh and 
Amosov estimated) during the irst six to eight years of impoundment into the 
78. R.  Sedykh i B.  Amosov, “Kapchagai — soiuznik Balkhasha [Kapchagai — the ally of Balkhash],” Literaturnaia gazeta (12 November 1969), 4.
79. Goldman, The spoils of progress, 58‑62.
80. ligii Stavskii, “Sud´ba Balkhasha [The fate of Balkhash],” Literaturnaia gazeta (19 November 1969), 11.
81. “Balkhash mozhno spasti! Pis´ma sporiat [Balkhash can be saved! Letters are arguing],” Literaturnaia gazeta (25 March 1970), 12.
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Kapchagai dam.82 The editorial board also gave an opportunity for the above‑mentioned 
Sedykh to make an excuse. He dared to denounce the above‑mentioned Kalachëv’s 
gigantic scheme of water diversion from the Ili River to the Chu River basin as 
“seditious,” seeking to evince that the prospective disappearance of Lake Balkhash 
was only related to this sort of too‑grandiose idea. Indeed, he promised to satisfy 
the requirement of a number of scholars to prolong the term of initial impoundment 
in the dam (from ive to six years as in the project document to eight to nine years) 
and, as a result, minimize the shrinkage and mineralization of Lake Balkhash. He 
promised “not to make a conlict with nature,” stating that “Balkhash City has stood, 
is standing, and will stand along the shore of Lake Balkhash.”83
The Kapchagai Reservoir began to impound water on 26 December 1969. The 
irst generator started operation on 22  December 1970. The Kazakh branch of 
Giprovodkhoz (Kazgiprovodkhoz) drew up another project document related to land 
reclamation on 52,000 hectares in the Akdala area only in 1971. This small‑scale 
project was named “Phase One.” Kazgiprovodkhoz proposed to take 1.1 km3 per year 
for irrigation, that is, one‑tenth of the annual water low of the Ili River. However, the 
Gosplan Expert Commission rejected the project document once again, restricting 
the organization of an experimental sovkhoz to 2,000 or 3,000 hectares in northern 
Akdala.84 First, the soil, relief, and other geographical conditions of the area were 
far from ideal; at least, they were much worse than those of the lower Syr‑Darya 
Massif. In addition, more than half of the potential plots should have been washed 
out thoroughly for cultivation because of soil salinity.85 second and more important, 
the Expert Sub‑Commission regarded it risky to further expand water‑consumptive 
irrigated lands without any coordinated scheme for seasonal water outlow from the 
Kapchagai Reservoir.86 In fact, the soviet government had already ordered the relevant 
ministries to formulate a “seasonal scheme” for water outlow from the Kapchagai 
dam in 1967.87 Kazgidroproekt was responsible for working out a coordinated 
82. U.M.  Akhmedsafin, “Opasnost´ odnobokogo podkhoda [The danger of one‑sided approach],” Literaturnaia gazeta (25 March 1970), 12.
83. R.  Sedykh, “Sem´ raz otmer´! [Measure out seven times!]” Literaturnaia gazeta (11 February 1970), 11.
84. RGAE, f.  4372, op.  66, d.  5058, Materialy kspertizy proektnogo zadaniia orosheniia i osvoeniia zemel´ Akdalinskogo massiva v nizov´iakh reki Ili Kazakhskoi SSR [Materials of the experts’ assessment about the project document on the irrigation and land development in the Akdala area in the lower reaches of the Ili River, Kazakh SSR], l. 221‑222, Postanovlenie Gos kspertizy [The resolution of the State Expert Commission] (14.04.1971).
85. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 5058, l. 226, 234, Zakliuchenie kspertnoi podkomissii [The conclusion of the experts’ subcommission] (31.03.1971) (l. 223‑247).
86. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 5058, l. 244‑245.
87. TsGA RK (Tsentral´nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan [Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan]), f. 1626, Ministerstvo melioratsii i vodnogo 
khoziaistva Kazakhskoi ssr [ministry of melioration and Water economy of Kazakh ssr], op. 3, 1940‑1975 gg., d. 1108, Dokumenty po zatopleniiu Kapchagaiskogo vodokhranilishcha (1972 g.). T. II. [Documents concering the impoundment in the Kapchagai Water Reservoir (1972). Volume 2], l. 75, Zapiska Ia. Sokolova, nachal´nika Kazgidroproekta [Report by Ia. Sokolov, the director of Kazgidroproekt].
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scheme. In accordance with these conclusions, the Gosplan Expert Commission 
demanded that the relevant ministries and agencies make out a coordinated plan 
for water outlow and impoundment, and a comprehensive scheme of land‑water 
usage downstream of the Ili River.88 However, subsequent deployment suggests that 
this requirement was never satisied. A number of stakeholders in water resources 
had demanded various amounts of water at a huge variety of times. It appeared to 
be just impossible to make up a ixed well‑coordinated scheme. Furthermore, the 
experimental discharge of copious amounts of water from the Kapchagai in March 
1972, which targeted the artiicial inducement of loods in the delta area to push 
the maximum growth of natural pasturage in spring, resulted in miserable failure.89 
A representative of Kazgidroproekt lamented at an interministerial meeting in April 
1972, “Considering the extraordinary complexity of evaluating the economic effects 
of various proposals [about seasonal discharges by the stakeholders], the [seasonal 
discharge] regime should be worked out every year … with the participation of 
the relevant agencies and with consideration of forecasts of inluent quantity into 
the [Kapchagai] Reservoir and Lake Balkhash.”90  
This evaluation of the Gosplan Expert Commission eventually determined the 
direction of the water development of the Ili River. The Akdala area would be further 
cultivated unless it would have negative effects on the other economic sectors and 
Lake Balkhash itself. In 1975, S. Duisenov, a hydrologist of the Hydrometeorological 
Department of Kazakh S.S.R., asserted that “the value of Balkhash as a source of 
water supply is much more signiicant than its signiicance in other economic sectors 
(water transportation, ish catch, and so on).”91 Nevertheless, local party oficials in 
Alma‑Ata and ameliorators in Moscow did not give up massive irrigation development 
in the Akdala region. Asanbai Askarov, the irst secretary of the Alma‑Ata obkom, 
expatiated how local leaders supported the idea of large‑scale land reclamation in the 
lower reaches of the Ili River. He honestly remembers in his memoir that he raised 
the issues of further development of the Akdala region as a promising agenda to Leonid 
Brezhnev himself, who visited Alma‑Ata in 1976 and took part in a meeting of the 
party‑economic activists of the Republic. Brezhnev had job experience in Kazakhstan 
as the party head of the Republic during the Khrushchev era, and was familiar with 
88. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 66, d. 5058, l. 221‑222.
89. TsGA RK, f.  1626, op.  3, d.  1107, Dokumenty po zatopleniiu Kapchagaiskogo vodokhranilishcha (1972 g.). T. I [Documents concering the impoundment in the Kapchagai Water Reservoir (1972). Volume 1], l.  101, Zapiska Zh.  Baigisieva po povodu rezul´tatov martovskogo popuska iz Kapchagaiskogo vodokhranil´shcha [Report by Zh. Baigisiev about the results of water discharges from the Kapchagai Water Reservoir in March].
90. TsGA RK, f.  1626, op.  3, d.  1107, l.  46, Zakliuchenie po materialam “K osnovnykh polozhenii po rezhimu popuskov vody v period pervonachal´nogo napolneniia Kapchagaiskogo vodokhranilishcha [The conclusion about the materials “To the basic provisions about the regime of water discharges during the period of primary impoundment in the Kapchagai Water Reservoir].”
91. S.T. Duisenov, “Problema ozera Balkhash v sviazi s vodokhoziaistvennym ispol´zovaniem stoka rek v ego basseine [Problems about Lake Balkhash in connection with the use of river flows in its basin],” meteorologiia i gidrologiia, no. 9 (1975): 59.
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the situation of the southern Balkhash region. There and then, he gave instructions 
to the above‑mentioned Alekseevskii, who accompanied Brezhnev, to accelerate the 
tempo of the irrigation development in the Akdala area. Alekseevskii agreed with the 
idea.92 After that, the ministry of land melioration and Water economy of the soviet 
Union, together with the Gosplan and the Ministry of Energy and Electriication, 
elaborated future developmental targets of the Ili River basin, and proposed in the irst 
place to develop 52,000 hectares in the Akdala area with the construction of one more 
reservoir nearby, while they estimated the potential to cultivate 124,000 hectares.93 
In 1980, the Ministry of Agriculture of Kazakh S.S.R. published a brochure about the 
future potential for rice cropping in the southern Balkhash region, which displayed 
the possibility of a total cultivation of 200,000 hectares for crop rotation, including 
100,000 hectares for rice, although only 20,000 hectares had been used for rice until 
that time.94 In spite of these initiatives and movement, the total area of irrigated plots in 
the downstream area of the Ili River did not greatly expand, limited to 30,000 hectares 
for rotation including 12,500‑14,200 hectares for rice.95
Afterward, it seems that the target of intensive cultivation gradually moved 
from the lower range of the Ili River to the middle reaches around the republican 
capital, Alma‑Ata. Askarov wrote in his memoir that the soil salinity of the Akdala 
made the republican authorities reconsider the place of intensive irrigation, and 
they afterwards began to push cultivation in proximity to the Kapchagai Reservoir. 
In addition, the Great Alma‑Ata Channel was planned and actually constructed from 
1981 to 1985, cutting across various tributaries of the Ili River from east to west.
In the early 1970s, Soviet hydrologists had already foreseen the shrinkage 
and the elevation of the salinity level of lake Balkhash owing to a combination 
of anthropogenic and natural factors. In June 1970, the Presidium of the Council 
of Ministers set an altitude of 341.0 m as the critical level of Lake Balkhash.96 As to 
the saline level, 2 g/l is the limit for domestic use. Although the irrigation potential 
was not fulilled in the lower Ili River, long‑term precipitation deiciencies had an 
impact on the altitude and the saline concentration of Lake Balkhash. The water 
level declined from 343 m in 1969 to 340.5 m in 1986. The saline level in the West 
92. A. Askarov, Sud´ba [Destiny] (Almaty: Merei, 1994), 145.
93. RGANI, f. 5, Organy TsK KPSS [The organs of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.], op. 69, Za 1966 g., d. 1077, Sel´skokhoziaistvennyi otdel. Dokumenty po voprosam melioratsii zemel´ [Agricultural Department. Documents about issues on land melioration], l.  138, Zapiska o bolee polnom ispol´zovanii Kapchagaiskogo vodokhranil´shcha dlia orosheniia zemel´ [Report about more complete use of the Kapchagai Water Reservoir for irrigation] (22.12.1976).
94. Rezervy uvelicheniia risa v iuzhnom Pribalkhash´e Alma‑Atinskoi oblasti [Available capacity of expansion of rice production around the southern shore of Lake Balkhash in Alma‑Ata Province] (Alma‑Ata: Kainar, 1980), 2.
95. Masanobu Nomura, “Kazafusutan ni okeru nouson no henyou: Baruhashi‑chiku Bereke mura ni tsuite [The Transformation of a Farming Village in Kazakhstan: The Case of Beleke Village in Balkhash District],” Kyouyou Kenkyuu [Cultural Research], 6, 3 (March 2000): 132 [in Japanese]. 
96. V. Nikolaev, “A mozhet, to ksperiment? [Maybe, is this an experiment?]” Kazakhstanskaia 
pravda (6 March 1987): 4.
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Balkhash increased from 1.23 g/l in 1970 to 1.79 g/l in 1983. As Kadar Keser and 
Hiroshi Matsuyama calculated, the inlow into the Ili delta decreased by an average 
of 3.4 km3 per year from 1970 to 1986, affected by natural factors (accounting 
for 62 percent) and anthropogenic causes (accounting for 38 percent).97 The 
continuous regression of Lake Balkhash obliged the power engineering authorities 
in Kazakhstan to further slow the tempo of impoundment into the Kapchagai 
Reservoir. Eventually, it never fully accumulated the planned volume of water 
(28.1 km3). Only two of ive power generators were operating in the middle of the 
1980s.98 When the altitude of Lake Balkhash dropped lower than the predetermined 
critical level in 1986, the authorities of Kazakh S.S.R. made a decision to start 
97. Kadar Kezer and Hiroshi Matsuyama, “Decrease of river runoff in the Lake Balkhash basin in Central Asia,” Hydrological processes, 20, 6 (April, 2006): 1422‑1423.
98. A.A. Tursunov, I.M. Mal´kovskii and Zh. Dostaev, “K peresmotru proektnoi otmetki NPU Kapchagaiskogo vodokhranil´shcha [About resetting of the planned normal headwater level of the Kapchagai Water Reservoir],” in A.A. Tursunov et al., eds., problemy kompleksnogo ispol´zovaniia vodnykh resursov Ili‑Balkhashskogo basseina. Sb. nauchnykh statei [Issues on 
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constructing the dam across the Uzyn‑Aral Strait, which was afterwards abandoned 
owing to public pressure. Afterward, hydrologists in Moscow and Leningrad 
“scientiically” veriied its ineffectiveness to maintain the altitude and salinity 
level of the Western Balkhash, and actually the water level once again began rising 
from 1987. The Kapchagai Hydropower Station became ineficient, the irrigation 
development was limited, and hence Lake Balkhash is still “standing” and supplying 
industrial water to Balkhash City.
At all events, it is possible to say that the republican and provincial political 
igures (for example, party oficials) were the most energetic advocates of water 
development in the Lake Balkhash basin. For local leaders, the implementation 
of gigantic projects was the simplest way to launt their authority and power. And 
every republican and provincial leader of Brezhnev’s time competed with each other 
over the acquisition of budgets and subsidies from Moscow for concrete projects. 
However, it should be added that Kunaev’s place in it was quite impalpable. First, 
Kunaev was a hero for citizens of Kapchagai City, because he gave signiicant 
contributions to the infrastructure building of the city. He wrote in his memoir that 
he provided directions for land reclamation of the Kerbulak Massif, located close to 
Kapchagai City. As a result, the newly cultivated lands began to supply vegetables, 
potatoes, and watermelons for the citizens of Kapchagai and Almaty.99 second, he 
had been repeatedly elected as the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Kazakh S.S.R. 
from the Bakanas electorate, located in the lower reaches of the Ili river (Balkhash 
District), which encompassed its delta zone and the Akdala area. Therefore, he was 
also responsible for the economic development and the environmental protection 
of the region. Third, Balkhash City was a special place for him, since he started 
his career in 1936 as a metallurgical engineer in the Balkhash Copper‑smelting 
Plant as soon as he graduated from an institute in Moscow. He could not put aside 
the misgivings of the citizens of Balkhash City. In fact, he referred to one dialogue 
with Aleksei Kosygin in his memoir where he petitioned him to lay down a water 
pipeline to Balkhash City in order to supply abundant fresh drinking water for the 
citizens, which was realized afterwards.100
Conclusion: Science, development, and modernization  
in the Brezhnev period
The “transformation of nature” concept was elaborated after World War II 
during Stalin’s Plan for Transformation of Nature. As a result of the scientiic 
and technological revolution, Soviet geographers, mainly staff of the Institute 
comprehensive use of water resources of the Ili‑Balkhash basin. Collection of research papers] (Alma‑Ata: Izdanie KazGU, 1985): 18‑19.
99. D.A. Kunaev, Ot Stalina do Gorbachëva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana) [From stalin to Gorbachev (In the aspect of the history of Kazakhstan)] (Almaty: Sanat, 1994): 184.
100. Kunaev, Ot Stalina do Gorbachëva, 160‑161.
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of Geography, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, renewed the concept after 1960 
with signiicant modiication of its content. Now, nature should be transformed 
with precautions against negative effects as a result of transformation and 
pre‑calculation of costs for this measurement. As mentioned above, this conceptual 
change itself was the Soviet version of “relexive modernization.”
Many of the projects related to transformation of nature were implemented 
without delay like the construction of the Karakum Canal in the Aral Sea basin 
and the Kapchagai Reservoir in the Lake Balkhash basin. These projects had 
received approval during the Stalin or Khrushchev era. Brezhnev’s signiicant 
concern for irrigation in Central Asia further promoted the expansion of irrigated 
lands in the Aral Sea basin. During the Stalinist period, agricultural and irrigation 
development had to be promoted swiftly and uniformly on a massive scale, which 
was regarded as “scientiic” by Stalin himself. Khrushchev’s de‑Stalinization 
unleased pro‑conservational voices of Soviet naturalists and scholars. However, 
Khrushchev himself advocated the massive and uniform style of development of the 
Stalinist type. He also often made self‑righteous decisions with scientiic contents, 
particularly about farming methods. Brezhnev also supported the idea of large‑scale 
extensive development, but only on the basis of feasibility and scientiic technical 
substantiation. As a result, Soviet scientists and engineers gained more liberty. 
If scientists and experts said “no,” then the Brezhnev regime did not give any political 
support. His regime clearly hesitated in implementing economically groundless or 
scientiically unsubstantiated projects related to nature transformation, charging 
inal decisions to Soviet scholars and technicians. Furthermore, it often took a great 
amount of time to scientiically verify the effectiveness of nature transformation 
measures. The diversity of their opinions and projections, in turn, hindered 
the formulation and implementation of actual measures. Thus, the U.S.S.R. 
Gosplan Expert Commission rejected twice the feasibility studies on agricultural 
development in the downstream area of the Ili River, but the Soviet government had 
not given any political endorsement to these projects. Local leaders strove to obtain 
the consent of Brezhnev himself about the further irrigation development in the 
Ili River basin, which inally ended in vain.
In this manner, it is possible to say that the renovated concept of “transformation 
of nature” in reality played both promoting and hampering roles in actual nature 
transformation in Central Asia. The “transformation of nature” concept during 
the post‑war Stalin era actually promoted the large‑scale irrigation development 
in Central Asia. The “unproductive” Aral Sea had been regarded as an inevasible 
sacriice to the economic development of Central Asia. Concerning the Ili‑Balkhash 
basin, the “transformation of nature” concept at least had restrictive effects on 
preventing catastrophic ecological degradation of Lake Balkhash. The freshwater 
of the West Balkhash was an important resource for the industrial development of 
Balkhash City. Therefore, both Kazakhstani and Russian scientists eagerly engaged 
in investigations into the negative impacts of the developmental measures on the 
altitude and salinity of Lake Balkhash. At the same time, Gerasimov’s concept of 
“transformation of nature” premised the priorities of science and human potential 
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under socialism, where all changes in environment could be properly foreseen and 
guided to maximize human wellbeing. However, the reality of actual developmental 
projects showed that it took so much time or appeared to be just impossible. The 
abandonment of several developmental plans in the lake Balkhash basin itself 
was a byproduct of the relexive modernization in the Soviet Union. However, 
then, the concept had already ceased to function as expected, as a lubricant for 
“real” nature transformations, but adversely played the role of restraining them if 
scientiically not justiied. The “transformation of nature” concept was a product 
of socialist modernity plus a tool for utopian social engineering. Deprivation of its 
effectiveness, accompanied by the “political indecisiveness” of the Brezhnev era, 
nulliied the legitimacy of socialist modernization, and, eventually, of the socialist 
ideology. The Brezhnev regime helplessly observed what was going on. As a result, 
Lake Balkhash was saved, but the Aral Sea was pushed forward unto its death.
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